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ALLOCATING FIXED COSTS OF DUAL-USE
FACILITIES BY EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
ACTUAL USE OR AVAILABILITY FOR USE?
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) generally exempts certain non-
profit organizations from federal income taxation.' Section 501(c)(3) of the
Code provides such an exemption for qualified educational organizations.
2
This tax-free status for educational organizations has remained virtually
unchanged since the establishment of the first federal income tax in the United
States.3 Extending tax exemptions to educational organizations promotes the
public welfare because qualifying education organizations provide instruction
to the public on subjects useful to individuals and beneficial to the community.4
The only important limitation upon the tax-free status of educational organiza-
tions is the Code provision taxing the unrelated business income of an other-
wise exempt organization.
5
1. See I.R.C. § 501(c) fWest 1984). Organizations that § 501(c) exempts from federal income
taxation include, among others, charitable organizations, educational institutions, scientific organiza-
tions, religious organizations, social welfare organizations, business leagues, social clubs, con-
sumer cooperatives, labor unions, and trade associations. Id. Numerous qualifications, condi-
tions, and exceptions apply to the general exemption from federal taxation for § 501(c) organiza-
tions. See id. §§ 501-08 (special rules apply to feeder corporations, private foundations, etc.).
See generally Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976) (overview of relevant Code sections and analysis of justifica-
tions for allowing income tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations).
2. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1984). Because § 501(c)(3) refers merely to "educational pur-
poses," the proper definition of the word "educational" has been the subject of frequent litiga-
tion. See 6 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.11 (1983 rev. voI. & Supp.
1984) (overview of judicial interpretations of relevant Code and regulation sections defining "educa-
tion"). The Treasury Department regulations provide that § 501(c)(3) of the Code uses the term
"educational" as relating to the "instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual
and beneficial to the community." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)(b) (1960). Although the
regulations also provide examples of educational organizations, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has held Treasury regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3), defining the term "educa-
tional," as unconstitutionally vague. See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030,
1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding "full and fair exposition test" encompassed in regulation's
definition of "education" was unconstitutionally vague); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), T.D.
6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 144 (example of educational organizations include primary or secondary
schools, colleges, trade schools, public discussion groups, correspondence schools, and museums).
See generally 6 J. MERTENS, supra, § 34.11, at 75-76 (analysis of Big Mama Rag holding).
3. See Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 1058, 1060 (2d Cir.
1984) (noting similarity between language of current and prior versions of § 501); see also Bittker
& Rahdert, supra note 1, at 301-30 (background on legislative history of tax exemption for non-
profit organization).
4. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)(b), T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 144; see also
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, at 334-35 (general discussion of justifications for exempting
charitable and educational organizations).
5. See I.R.C. § 511 (a)(1) (West 1984) (tax imposed on unrelated business taxable income
of § 501(c) organizations). Unrelated business taxable income is the gross income, less the directly
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In 1950 Congress added the predecessor sections of 502 through 514 to
the Code in response to well-publicized accounts of exempt organizations, par-
ticularly educational organizations, abusing their privileged status to generate
otherwise fully taxable income in activities unrelated to their exempt function.'
While the taxation of unrelated business income of exempt organizations is
similar in theory to the computation of tax for ordinary business entities,
7
the need to allocate the income and expenses between the exempt and unrelated
activities greatly complicates the determination of the proper unrelated business
tax liability.' The allocation is often tedious and controversial, especially when
an exempt organization uses the same facility both for exempt purposes and
for the production of unrelated business income., In Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute v. Commissioner,10 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
connected allowable deductions from any regularly carried on trade or business, the conduct of
which is not substantially related to the organization's exempt function. Id. § 512(a)(1); see Treas.
Reg. § 1.512(a)-i, T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 162-63 (provides more detailed definition of unrelated
business taxable income); see also I.R.C. § 513(a) (West 1984) (defines unrelated trade or business);
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1, T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274, 275 (elaborating § 513 definition of unrelated
trade or business).
6. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 944, §§ 301, 331, 64 Stat. 947, 957-58 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. §§ 502-14 (West 1984)); see Moore, Current Problems of Exempt Organizations, 24
TAx. L. REv. 469, 469-74 (1969) (concise summary of legislative and judicial background of tax
on unrelated business income). Prior to 1950, any unrelated income received by an exempt organiza-
tion, regardless of the source of the income, was not taxable to the organization if the organiza-
tion used the unrelated income to further the organization's exempt function. See Trinidad v.
Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (destination, not source, of income
is dispositive test for taxability). Subsequent lower court decisions substantially expanded the
destination-of-income test that the Supreme Court established in Trinidad. See, e.g., Roche's
Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938) (profits from bathing beach business
feeding a charitable organization not taxable); Sam Springs Home v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A.
198, 217 (1927) (income from greenhouse, cotton gin, and electric generating plant exempted
from taxation); Appeal of Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61, 70 (1926) (religious organiza-
tion's earnings from publications and inn income held exempt from taxation).
The most notorious abuse of the tax exemption provided to charitable and educational
organizations involved the acquisition of the nation's largest manufacturer of noodles for the
benefit of the School of Law of New York University. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner,
190 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1951) (tax-exempt status of feeder corporation upheld), rev'g 14 T.C.
922 (1950). See generally Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated
Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1280 (1968) (overview and critique
of tax on unrelated business income) [hereinafter cited as The Macaroni Monopoly]. Sparked
by the public reaction to the Mueller decision, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1950 to
ease the concerns of private industry over unfair competition from exempt organizations. See
Moore, supra, at 470-71 (discussion of public and congressional reaction to Mueller); see also
infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (analysis of legislative history of Revenue Act of 1950).
7. 4 B. BnTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCo E, ESTATES & GiFss 103.3 (1981 & Supp.
1 1984). In computing the tax on unrelated business income, the term "taxable income" as used
in § 11 of the Code, which imposes a tax on corporate taxable income, reads as "unrelated business
taxable income." I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (West 1984).
8. 4 B. BrrTKER, supra note 7, at 103.3.
9. Id.
10. 732 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Circuit addressed this difficult allocation problem, by considering what con-
stitutes a reasonable basis for allocating the fixed costs of a dual-use facility.' 1
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (Rensselaer) is a tax-exempt educational
organization incorporated under the laws of the State of New York.'2 Rensselaer
owned and operated a fieldhouse used both for exempt purposes 3 and for
the production of unrelated business income.' 4 Section 511 (a)(1) of the Code
subjected the unrelated business income generated by the commercial use of
the fieldhouse to taxation.' 5 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Com-
missioner) contested the amount of deductible expenses taken from the
unrelated business gross income by Rensselaer in computing its unrelated
business taxable income for the taxable year ending in 1974.16 Rensselaer filed
a petition with the United States Tax Court (Tax Court) for a redetermination
of the Commissioner's assessment of a deficiency in the unrelated business
tax due from Rensselaer.'"
The Tax Court identified three types of deductible expenses related to
the operation of the fieldhouse.18 Rensselaer's direct expenses, those specifically
identified with particular commercial uses, were never in dispute and clearly
were deductible.1 9 Additionally, the Tax Court considered the minor issue of
Rensselaer's variable expenses, 20 those which varied in proportion to use but
11. Id. at 1062.
12. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 967, 968 (1982).
13. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1059. In Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute v. Commissioner, the
parties stipulated that the primary function of the fieldhouse was to carry out Rensselaer's educa-
tional responsibilities. Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 968. Student uses of the facility included physical
education, college ice hockey, student ice skating, intramurals, and commencement activities. Id.
14. Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 968. In Rensselaer, the unrelated business uses of the fieldhouse
included commercial ice shows and public ice skating. Id.
15. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1059; see I.R.C. § 51 1(a)(1) (West 1984) (income from unrelated
business activities is taxable).
16. Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 968. The Tax Court in Rensselaer noted that the parties stipulated
all the material facts. Id. at 968. Consequently, no factual disputes were before the Second Cir-
cuit. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1059. Rensselaer's federal income tax period was on a fiscal year
basis ending June 30, 1974. Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 968.
17. Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 967.
18. Id. at 968-69.
19. Id. In Rensselaer, the direct expenses of the fieldhouse included costs specifically iden-
tified with various events, such as contract and labor costs attributable to a specific event. Id.
at 969 n.5. The parties agreed that Rennselaer's direct expenses totalled $371,407 for the year
ending in 1974. Id. at 968-69. The parties did not dispute the deductibility of Rensselaer's direct
expenses. Id. at 969; see I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (West 1984); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(b), T.D. 7392,
1976-1 C.B. 162, 162-63.
20. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060. The Second Circuit in Rensselaer noted that the Tax
Court found that total variable expenses of the fieldhouse amounted to $197,210 allocable on
a basis of actual use. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-I(c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 163 (requiring
allocation of expenses from dual-use facilities on reasonable basis); see also, Kannry, How Hospitals
Can Minimize Their Potential Exposure to the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 43 J. TAX'N 166,
168-69 (1975) (example of application of variable expense allocation).
While the Commissioner approved of allocating variable expenses on a basis of actual use,
the Commissioner contended that Rensselaer should have added certain adjustments to the total
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which Rensselaer could not identify with specific events.2 The dispute, however,
centered primarily on Rensselaer's fixed expenses of operating the fieldhouse,
which included those costs, such as depreciation and salaries, that did not
vary in proportion to the use of the facility."
Rensselaer asserted that the school legitimately could allocate fixed costs
between the exempt educational use and the taxable commercial use on the
basis of relative times of actual use for each purpose.23 Rensselaer thus sought
to calculate the proportion of deductible fixed expenses by dividing the total
number of hours the fieldhouse was in commercial use by the total number
of hours the facility was in actual use for any activity.24 The Commissioner
however, argued that the proper allocation basis was one of total time available
for use, in which the fractional denominator was the total number of hours
in the taxable year.
25
The Tax Court reduced the deficiency asserted against Renesselaer, holding
that allocations based on actual use were reasonable within the meaning of
Treasury Department regulation section 1.512(a)-1(c). 26 The Commissioner
hours of actual use, thus "increasing the denominator and reducing the portion of deductible
expenses." Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 973; see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (definitions
of actual-use and availability for use allocation methods). The Tax Court upheld only one minor
adjustment, which neither party appealed. Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 973; see Rensselaer, 732 F.2d
at 1060 (neither side appealed Tax Court decision regarding amount of deductible variable expenses).
21. Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 969 n.6.
22. Id. The Second Circuit in Rensselaer noted that the stipulated fixed expenses were:
Salaries and fringe benefits ......................................... S 59,415
Depreciation ...................................................... 29,397
Repairs and replacements ........................................... 14,031
Operating expenditures ............................................. 1,356
$104,199
Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060.
23. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060.
24. Id. The college in Rensselaer would calculate the amount of fixed expenses properly
deductible by multiplying the total amount of fixed expenses incurred by the percentage of unrelated
business use to total actual use for all purposes. Id.
25. Id. In allocating the expenses attributable to a dual-use facility, taxpayer has an incen-
tive to allocate as much of the expenses as possible to the unrelated business usage to receive
a tax benefit from expenses otherwise nondeductible by an exempt organization. See id. at 1065
(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (noting similar incentive in home office expense allocations). By using
the total number of hours in the taxable year rather than the total hours the facility actually
was in use as the denominator, the Commissioner's availability for use allocation method effec-
tively reduced the portion of expenses deductible by the college in Rensselaer. Rensselaer, 79
T.C. at 973.
The Second Circuit noted that the difference in tax liability between allocations based on
actual use and availability for use in Rensselaer amounted to only $9,259. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d
at 1060. Although the actual liability at stake in Rensselaer was minimal, the potential preceden-
tial value of this case of first impression did not go unnoticed. See id. at 1059 (amicus curiae
briefs filed by American Council on Education, National Institute of Independent Colleges and
Universities, and Yale University suggest importance of Rensselaer decision).
26. Rensselaer, 70 T.C. at 974; see Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B.
162, 163 (educational organizations must allocate expenses attributable to dual-use facility between
the exempt and non-exempt uses on "reasonable basis").
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appealed the Tax Court decision to the Second Circuit,27 asserting that alloca-
tions based on actual use fail to meet the statutory requirement that deductible
expenses must be "directly connected with" the unrelated business activity.2
The Commissioner criticized the analogy the Tax Court drew between dual-
use facility allocations and home office expense allocations.29 The Commis-
sioner also argued that the "directly connected with" language in section 512
of the Code requires a narrow interpretation to prevent exempt organizations
from abusing their privilege. 0 The Second Circuit nevertheless rejected the
Commissioner's arguments and affirmed the Tax Court decision.
3 1
In Rensselaer, the Second Circuit traced the historical origins of the tax
on unrelated business income and carefully reviewed the applicable statute
and regulations.32 On the basis of this analysis, the Rensselaer court rejected
the Commissioner's assertion that actual-use allocations result in expenses not
directly connected with the unrelated business activity.3 3 The Second Circuit
stated that the Commissioner's position was contrary to both the underlying
legislative intent in taxing unrelated business income and the applicable Treasury
regulations. 34 By taxing unrelated business income, Congress primarily sought
to achieve parity between exempt and non-exempt organizations engaged in
similar commercial activities without jeopardizing the basic purpose of the
tax exemption.33 The Second Circuit stated that allocations based on availability
for use failed to promote this type of equality between exempt and non-exempt
organizations.3 6 The Rensselaer court interpreted the Treasury regulations as
providing that, when allocated on a "reasonable basis," the expenses of a
facility used for both exempt and commercial purposes are "proximately and
27. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060. Either the Commissioner or the taxpayer may appeal
a decision of the Tax Court to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. I.R.C. § 7482(a)
(West 1984). Because Rensselaer was a New York corporation, proper venue for an appeal rested
in the Second Circuit. See id. § 7482(b)(l)(B) (for redetermination of corporate tax liability, venue
lies in circuit of principal place of business of corporation).
28. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060. In Rensselaer, the Commissioner relied on § 512(a)(1)
of the Code, which requires that deductible expenses by directly connected with the unrelated
business activity. Id. passim; see I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (West 1984) (defining unrelated business income
as gross income from unrelated business activities less allowable deductions directly connected
with unrelated activities).
29. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060-62; see infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text (analysis
of home office expense cases).
30. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060-61; see infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (analysis
of § 512 znd applicable regulations).
31. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'g 79 T.C. 967 (1982).
32. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1060-61; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussion
of historical origins of tax on unrelated business income).
33. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d 1061-62; see infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text (explaining
that Commissioner's position ignores clear and unambiguous statutory and regulatory language).
34. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1061; see infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (availability
for use allocations inconsistent with legislative intent to achieve parity between exempt and non-
exempt organizations).
35. See Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1061 (summary of legislative intent of unrelated business
income tax).
36. Id. at 1062.
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primarily related" to the commercial activity and, therefore, are directly con-
nected with the unrelated business activity. 37 The regulations, therefore, make
such expenses expressly deductible. 38 Like the Tax Court, the Second Circuit
also found the home office expense cases analogous to Rensselaer, a case of
first impression; 39 and deferring to the Tax Court's expertise in the applica-
tion of the tax laws,4" the Second Circuit found no error in the Tax Court's
decision that Rensselaer's method of allocation was reasonable'.
4
Conversely, the dissent in Rensselaer primarily argued that the fundamental
37. Id. at 1061. As the Second Circuit noted in Rensselaer, § 512 of the Code defines unrelated
business income as:
... the gross income derived by any [tax-exempt] organization from any unrelated
trade or business ... regularly carried on by it, less the deductions allowed... which
are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business ....
I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (West 1984); see Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1061 (noting definition of unrelated
business income under § 512). The applicable regulations further provide that:
... [t]o be deductible in computing unrelated business taxable income.., expenses,
depreciation, and similar items not only must qualify as deductions allowed by chapter
I of the Code, but also must be directly connected with the carrying on of the unrelated
trade or business ... [with the phrase] to be 'directly connected with' . . . [meaning]
an item of deduction must have proximate and primary relationship to the carrying
on of that business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(a), T.D. 7392; 1976-1 C.B. 162, 162. A subsequent subsection of the
same regulation provides:
(c) Dual use offacilities orpersonnel. Where facilities are used both to carry on exempt
activities and to conduct unrelated trade or business activities, expenses, depreciation
and similar items attributable to such facilities (as, for example, items of overhead),
shall be allocated between the two uses on a reasonable basis. Similarly, where person-
nel are used both to carry on exempt activities and to conduct unrelated trade or business
activities, expenses and similar items attributable to such personnel (as, for example,
items of salary) shall be allocated between the two uses on a reasonable basis. The
portion of any such items so allocated to the unrelated trade or business activity is
proximately and primarily related to that business activity, and shall be allowable as
a deduction in computing unrelated business taxable income in the manner and to the
extent permitted by section 162, section 167 or other relevant provisions of the Code.
Id. § 1.512(a)-l(c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 163 (emphasis added). Overhead and personnel
expenses are ordinary and necessary business expenses and are therefore allowable deductions
pursuant to § 162 of chapter I of the Code. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1984). Likewise, depreciation
deductions are allowable under § 167 of chapter 1 of the Code. Id. § 167; see Kannry, supra
note 20, at 168-69 (example of application of Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-I).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-I, T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 162-63.
39. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062; see infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text (analysis
of home office expense cases).
40. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1061. The Second Circuit in Rensselaer noted that appellate
courts should not review the Tax Court's interpretation of the tax law unmindful of the Tax
Court's expertise in these matters. Id.; see ABKCO Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 482 F.2d 150,
155 (3d Cir. 1973) (affirming Tax Court interpretation of tax consequences of alleged royalties
contract). Courts properly may attach weight to legal decisions made by administrative bodies
having special competence to deal with the subject matter. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320
U.S. 489, 502 (1943) (appellate courts should give due regard to special competence of Tax Court).
Tax Court resolutions of questions of tax law thus warrant deference and appellate courts should
follow Tax Court decisions whenever possible. ABKCO Indus., 482 F.2d at 155.
41. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1061-62.
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differences between exempt and taxable entities required a stricter standard
of deductibility for exempt organizations with unrelated business income than
for taxable organizations. 2 The dissent contrasted the Treasury regulation
governing expense deductions for profit-seeking entities with the narrower
regulations governing unrelated business income. 3 The dissent also questioned
the validity of using the home office expense cases as evidence of the
reasonableness of actual-use allocations, in light of the Ninth Circuit's reversal
of an actual-use allocation in a home office expense case." The dissent found
precedent for its proposition that actual-use allocations improperly resulted
in expenses not directly connected with the unrelated business activity in Pitts-
burgh Press Club v. United States." In Pittsburgh Press Club, the Third Cir-
cuit determined a social club's unrelated business income by considering
deductible only those expenses that the club would not have incurred but for
the unrelated business activity." 6 The Rensselaer court, in affirming the Tax
Court decision, however, distinguished Pittsburgh Press Club by noting that
that case involved the possible revocation of the club's tax-exempt status for
engaging in outside business activities proscribed by the Code as opposed to
unrelated business income that an exempt educational organization may earn
permissibly.
47
42. Id. at 1063-64 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1064-65; see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63-64 (ordinary
and necessary expenses directly connected with profit-seeking business are deductible); id. §
1.512(a)-l(a), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 162 (unrelated business expenses must be directly con-
nected with unrelated activity and otherwise qualify as deductions); see also infra note 56 (com-
parison of conjunctive and disjunctive language in unrelated business income and deductible business
expense regulations).
44. Id. at 1065-66; see infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (analysis of Ninth Circuit's
reversal of Tax Court's approval of actual-use allocations of home office expenses).
45. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1066 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); see Pittsburgh Press Club v.
United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.), on remand, 462 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd,
615 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 761. In Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, the Third Circuit noted that
following an extensive audit the Internal Revenue Service revoked the club's exempt status and
assessed income taxes on club revenues for subsequent taxable years. Id. at 753. The Internal
Revenue Service asserted that the club's continued practice of renting its facilities for outside
affairs resulted in the receipt of substantial revenues from outside sources. Id. This practice con-
stituted engaging in business in violation of § 501(c)(7) of the Code, which requires a social club
to operate exclusively for nonprofit purposes. Id. at 753-54; see I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (West 1984)
(exempt social clubs prohibited from engaging in outside business activities).
47. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062. In distinguishing Pittsburgh Press Club, the Second Cir-
cuit in Rensselaer noted that § 501(c)(7) of the Code prohibits an exempt social club from engag-
ing in any outside business activity. Id.; see I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (West 1984) (substantially all activities
of social clubs must be for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(7)-1(b) (1958) (clubs engaging in business, such as making their facilities available for
public rental, are not exempt from taxation under § 501(a)); see also supra note 46 (discussion
of Commissioner's position in Pittsburgh Press Club). In fact, the only outside profits permitted
under § 501(c)(7) of the Code are those profits strictly incidental to the club's activities and that
are either negligible or nonrecurring. See United States v. Fort Worth Club of Fort Worth, Texas,
345 F.2d 52, 57-58 (5th Cir.) (rental income deemed substantial and profitable business and not
1985]
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The Second Circuit in Rensselaer correctly noted that the Commissioner
ignored his own definition of the concept of "directly connected with" included
in the regulations. 48 By expressly including depreciation, personnel expenses,
and overhead, the Treasury regulation pertaining to exempt organizations' dual
use of facilities or personnel is directly applicable to all the fixed expenses
related to Renssalaer's fieldhouse.4 9 Although the Code and Treasury regula-
tions require a narrow interpretation of what constitutes a deductible expense
for an exempt organization," the dual-use regulation explicitly states that the
portion of fixed expenses allocated on a reasonable basis is proximately and
primarily related to the unrelated business activity.5' In turn, regulation sec-
tion 1.512(a)-l(a) defines the concept "directly connected with" as requiring
an item of deduction to have a proximate and primary relationship to the
conduct of the unrelated business activity.12 Reasonably allocated fixed
expenses, consequently, have the requisite direct connection with the unrelated
business activity." In an administrative ruling prior to Rensselaer, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service reached the identical conclusion.54 The Commissioner and
the dissent in Rensselaer ardently strived to avoid giving section 512 and the
applicable regulations their natural reading.5 Nevertheless, the distinction
drawn between the deductibility requirements of exempt organizations and
profit-seeking businesses,56 as well as, the dissent's statutory construction
permissibly derived from club's social activities or services usually provided to members), modified
and aff'd on rehearing, 348 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1965). In Pittsburgh Preys Club, the Third Circuit
held that when measuring the amount of outside profits allowable under § 501(c)(7), a social
club may not reduce its net profit by costs that the club would not have incurred but for the
unrelated business activity. 579 F.2d at 761-62. The Pittsburgh Press Club court explicitly limited
its holding to situations in which courts inquire into the propriety of the revocation of a social
club's exemption. Id. at 762.
48. See Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062.
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 163; supra note 22 (list
of fixed expenses related to Rensselaer's fieldhouse).
50. See I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (West 1984) (expenses must be otherwise deductible and directly
connected with the unrelated business activity); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(a), T.D. 7392, 1976-1
C.B. 162, 162 (same).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 163.
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(a), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 162.
53. See id. § 1.512(a)-l(a), (c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 162-63 (direct connection of
reasonably allocated fixed expenses follows from complete reading of relevant regulations).
54. See Rev. Rul. 76-402, 1976-2 C.B. 177, 178 (summer tennis camp's use of exempt school's
facilities resulted in dual use of facilities, with allocable portion of expenses deductible in com-
puting unrelated business taxable income).
55. See Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1064-65 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (discussing, with approval,
Commissioner's position).
56. Id. The Rensselaer dissent contrasted the disjunctive language in the regulation govern-
ing business deductions for profit-seeking organizations with the conjunctive wording in the regula-
tion relating to the tax on unrelated business income. Id. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a),
T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63.64 (expenses deductible by profit-seeking organizations include ordinary
and necessary expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to taxpayer's business) with Treas.
Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(a), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 162 (expenses not only must qualify as deduc-




argument57 fails in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the statute
and regulations. 8 Accordingly, the dispositive issue in Rensselaer, as the Second
Circuit noted, was whether the college's actual-use allocation method was
reasonable.
5 9
Taxpayers determine their income for tax purposes according to the regular
method of accounting used in keeping their financial books.6" Taxpayers,
furthermore, have the discretion to choose the methods best adapted to their
requirements, as long as the method clearly reflects taxable income.
6'
Availability for use and actual-use allocations are differing accounting methods
analogous to straight-line and service-hours depreciation methods,
respectively. 62 Like their theoretical equivalents, allocations of the fixed costs
of a dual-use facility based on both availability for use and actual use may
clearly reflect income in a given fact situation.63 In Rensselaer, the Commis-
sioner did not claim that the college's allocation method was unreasonable
as applied to the facts."' Accordingly, nothing prohibited Rensselaer from
exercising its discretion in choosing actual-use allocation as its accounting
method.
65
Both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit analogized the Rensselaer facts
to the home office expense cases. 66 The rationales used in allocating home
57. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1065 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The dissent in Rensselaer implied
that the more general provision of Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(a) somehow negates the more specific
provision in subsection (c), which permits allocations of expenses on a reasonable basis. Id.;
see Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B. 162, 163.
58. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200-01, 214 (1976) (statutory language
controls if sufficiently clear in this context); see also Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co.,
450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (Treasury regulations sustained unless unreasonable and plainly incon-
sistent with Code); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948) (Treasury
regulations overruled only for significant reasons).
59. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1061; see Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-i(c), T.D. 7392, 1976-1 C.B.
162, 163 (mandating allocation of dual-use expenses on reasonable basis).
60. See I.R.C. § 446(a) (West 1984) (taxable income computed under taxpayer's method
of accounting unless such method does not clearly reflect income); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)-(I)
& (2) T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 217 (same).
61. See I.R.C. § 446(b) (West 1984) (taxpayer has discretion to choose accounting method
that clearly reflects income); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(1) & (2), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 217 (same).
62. Cf. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1065 n.3. (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (analyzing deprecia-
tion methods to argue majority decision improperly allowed expense deductions when fieldhouse
was not in commercial use). Straight-line depreciation is a function of the passage of time and
is conceptually most accurate when the availability of the asset is more important than the actual
use of the asset. E. SPLLER, FiNArciA AccourNrnN 276 (1971). Conversely, service-hours deprecia-
tion is a function of actual usage in a period relative to projected total usage and is more appropriate
when physical use is the most important factor in the determination of an asset's useful life.
Id. at 278.
63. Compare I.R.C. § 280A(c)(4)(C) (West 1984) (availability for use used in allocations
of home day care center facilities) with id. § 280A(e)(1) (actual-use allocation used for rental
vacation homes).
64. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062.
65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (taxpayer has discretion over choice of
accounting methods if such methods clearly reflect income).
66. See Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062; Rensselaer, 70 T.C. at 970-72; see also infra note
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office expenses between business and personal use are helpful in judging the
reasonableness of actual-use allocations in the unrelated business income
context. 67 Even the Rensselaer dissent agreed that the home office allocations
are somewhat comparable to the allocations required of exempt organizations
engaged in unrelated business activities. 68 Prior to the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 6' home office expenses were deductible even though the
business use of that portion of the house was not exclusive.7" Taxpayers thus
had to allocate the home office expenses between the deductible business and
nondeductible personal use.7" The Tax Court's approval of taxpayers allocating
the home office expenses on the more beneficial actual-use basis remained
unchallenged until Gino v. Commissioner.72 In Gino, the Tax Court set out
the rationale of the preceding home office expense -case: that allocation of
home office expenses on an actual-use basis more clearly reflects the proper
business deductions allowed than allocations based on availability for use.
73
The Tax Court reasoned that allocations based on availability for use rest
on the erroneous and misleading assumption that the portion of the house
used for dual purposes, when idle, is not equally available for either business
or personal use.74 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit in Gino reversed the Tax
Court decision. 75 Noting that the regulation proscribing deductions of per-
sonal expenses did not specify how to allocate expenses attributable to
70 (list of home office expense cases).
67. Rensselear, 732 F.2d at 1065 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). With both home office ex-
pense and unrelated business income allocations, an incentive exists to allocate as much of the
expenses as possible to the taxable activity. Id.; see supra note 25 (incentive to reduce tax liability
and receive tax benefit for otherwise nondeductible expenses).
68. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1065 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
69. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
70. See, e.g., Browne v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 723, 728-29 (1980) (self-employed tax-
payer performed craft work, painting, medical and legal transcribing, and tax return preparation
in portion of house); Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304, 313-15 (1973) (taxpayers were high
school teachers who performed nonclassroom duties at home), rev'd, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); International Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 94, 107-08
(1970) (proportionate cost of home office and studio deductible by self-employed entertainer).
See generally Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach
to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 859, 912-15 (1974) (analysis of home office expenses
in context of general nondeductibility of personal expenses).
71. See I.R.C. § 262 (West 1984) (personal expenses not deductible); id. § 162 (ordinary
and necessary business expenses generally deductible). The expenses related to the portion of
the house used as an office are deductible. See id. The expenses involved in maintaining a per-
sonal residence, however, are generally nondeductible personal expenses. See id. § 262.
72. 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'g 60 T.C. 304 (1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
73. See Gino, 60 T.C. at 315 (availability of use allocations based on erroneous assumption).
74. Id. As homeowner, the taxpayer may choose to use a portion of his house at his discre-
tion for either business or personal reasons. Id. If the facility was equally available at all times
for both uses, a taxpayer may allocate reasonably a portion of the fixed expenses of the facility,
while not in use, should be allocated to both purposes. Cf. Browne v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.
723, 730 (1980) (Hall, J., concurring) (no statutory warrant for applying more severe proration
test for qualifying home office expenses than for expenses of any other dual-use facility).
75. Gino, 538 F.2d at 835.
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deductible home office expenses, 6 the Ninth Circuit deferred to a revenue
ruling that illustrated and applied the Internal Revenue Service's availability
for use allocation method. 77 While the Ninth Circuit did reverse the Tax Court's
approval of actual-use allocations in Gino, it was the only circuit to so rule.7 8
The Tax Court also specifically reaffirmed its position in Browne v.
Commissioner"8 holding that the fraction applicable to allocating home office
expenses was the total time the taxpayer used her home for business divided
by the time the taxpayer actually used the space for all purposes."0 As the
concurring opinion in Browne noted, the Ninth Circuit did not base its reversal
in Gino on the merits of availability for use allocation, but rather on
administrative deference to a revenue ruling.' Since Browne, the addition to
the Code of section 280A with its exclusivity requirement effectively has
preempted any further judicial development of the allocation issue for home
office expenses.
82
In addition to questioning the validity of the home office expense analogy
following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gino, 3 the dissent in Rensselaer argued
that the analogy was flawed because a homeowner could use his home for
any purpose he chooses while an exempt educational organization must dedicate
its facilities to exempt purposes, undercutting the reasonableness in allocating
idle time proportionally.8 4 The dissent's argument, however, fails to recognize
that an educational organization does not jeopardize its exempt status if the
organization uses some facilities for dual purposes.8 5 Under dual usage, a
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3), T.D. 6313, 1958-2 C.B. 113, 115 (portion of expenses
properly attributable to business is deductible as business expense).
77. Gino, 538 F.2d at 835; see Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52 (Example 5 illustrates
computation of allowable deduction for portion of expenses attributable to business use of home).
78. See Gino, 538 F.2d at 835.
79. Gino, 73 T.C. 723, 728-29 (1980).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 730-31 (Hall, J., concurring). The concurring opinion in Browne v. Commis-
sioner expressly refused to uphold the Commissioner's position on availability for use alloca-
tions, even though an existing revenue ruling outlined that position. Id. A revenue ruling is merely
the legal opinion of an Internal Revenue Service attorney and lacks the force or effect of law.
See, e.g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947) (interpretative rulings of Treasury
regulations regarding definition of independent contractors for social security tax purposes ignored);
Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 688, 696 n.10 (9th Cir. 1973) (revenue ruling on
nondeductibility of depreciation on equipment owned by taxpayer and used in self-construction
of capital improvements deemed in conflict with revenue statutes and, therefore, was without
any force), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 1 (1974); Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs., Inc. v. United
States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971) (ignoring revenue ruling defining per diem living
allowances at remote job site as wages for income tax withholding purposes).
82. I.R.C. § 280A (c) (West 1984). Section 280A(c) limits allowable deductions for home
office expenses to those portions of the home used exclusively and on a regular basis for business
purposes. Id. Section 280A(c), therefore, eliminated the need to allocate expenses between the
dual uses. See id.
83. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1065-66 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1065.
85. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (entity organized
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facility's idle time arguably is equally available for both exempt and commer-
cial activities . 6 An educational institution, therefore, reasonably could allocate
fixed expenses during idle time in proportion to the actual use of the facility.' 7
Allocating the fixed expenses of a dual-use facility on the basis of actual
use would better effectuate the legislative purpose of taxing unrelated business
income. 8 While the general purpose of the Revenue Act of 1950 was to raise
revenues, 89 the legislative history indicates that Congress had a more specific
intent in enacting the provisions regarding the tax on unrelated business
income.90 Congress sought to eliminate the unfair competitive advantage exempt
organizations enjoyed over their profit-seeking counterparts9' and to achieve
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes still may
have net income); C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1951) (upholding
exemption for feeder corporation generating business income unrelated to educational function
of donee). See generally Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3)-How Much Unrelated
Business Activity?, 21 TAx. L. R~v. 53 (1965) (overview of separation of qualification for exemp-
tion and taxation of unrelated business income); 6 J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 34.07, at 35-36
(judicial interpretations of "exclusively" have allowed some activities not directly furthering
organization's exempt function).
86. But cf. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1065 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (court cannot reasonably
assume that fieldhouse's idle time was equally available because Rensselaer would not have received
its exemption in first place). See supra note 85 and accompanying text (exempt organizations
allowed some unrelated activities without risking loss of exemption).
87. Cf. supra note 67-68 & 74 and accompanying text (unrelated business income alloca-
tions analogous to home office expense allocations).
88. Cf., Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062 (Commissioner's interpretation of § 512 does not
fulfill congressional intent in passing statute).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950) reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380,
380 (1950) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 2319]. The House Ways and Means Committee
stated that the various revenue raising provisions in their Revenue Act of 1950 tax bill were to
recoup partially the loss from the substantial reductions in war excise taxes. Id. The bill included
changes in the tax treatment of charitable and educational organizations as one of the revenue
raising provisions. Id. at 381. After the House passed its version of the bill, substantial increases
in defense expenditures related to the United States' military involvement in Korea compelled
the Senate to convert the excise tax reduction bill into a revenue producing measure. See S. REP.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950) reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 484 (1950).
90. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (primary purpose for imposition of tax
on unrelated business income was elimination of unfair competition and inequity in tax system);
See also Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 539-41 (5th Cir. 1982)
(discussion of history of 1950 tax legislation); Veterans' Found. v. United States, 281 F.2d 912,
913-14 (10th Cir. 1960) (same); United States v. Community Serv. Inc., 189 F.2d 421, 425-27
(4th Cir. 1951) (same).
91. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 89, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. at 409 (1950) (unrelated
business tax provisions primarily directed at problem of unfair competition); Treas. Reg. §
1.513-1(b), T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274, 275 (same); see also Comment, Colleges, Charities, and
the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 875 (1951) (primary purpose of unrelated business
tax was elimination of unfair competition between taxable and tax-exempt businesses). The specific
competitive advantage possessed by an exempt business is a higher rate of return on the business'
capital, which allows the exempt business to expand operations and compete more effectively
against nonexempt businesses. See The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 6, at 1281-82. See generally




equity in the tax system by closing the loophole that allowed exempt organiza-
tions to engage in otherwise taxable activities at no tax cost.92 While both
allocation methods eliminate the inherent inequity that previously existed in
the Code, only actual-use allocations encourage the achievement of parity
between exempt and non-exempt organizations engaged in similar commercial
endeavors.9 3 Actual-use allocations distribute a ratable share of the fixed costs
to those periods when the facility is not in use.9 4 This distribution mirrors
the treatment the Code allows to non-exempt businesses.95 Conversely, under
availability for use allocations, an exempt organization could not allocate any
of its fixed costs to the facility's idle time.9 6 Rather than achieving parity,
therefore, availability for use allocations would place exempt organizations
at a competitive disadvantage with its non-exempt counterparts. 7
In affirming the Tax Court decision, the Second Circuit properly held
that Rensselaer's method of allocating the fixed expenses of its fieldhouse was
reasonable within the meaning of the applicable regulations.'8 Allocations based
on actual use satisfy the regulatory requirement of allocation on a reasonable
basis99 and fulfill the legislative intent of the unrelated business income tax
provisions of the Code. 100 Moreover, with general public policy providing
privileged status to educational organizations, preference should go to the
allocation method that is more beneficial to the exempt institution when choos-
ing between two reasonable accounting methods. The approval of allocating
the fixed costs of a dual-use facility on an actual-use basis could have a
beneficial impact nationwide on all organizations exempt from federal income
taxation by section 501(c)(3).'' With the increasing difficulty that educational
92. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c), T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274, 275 (purpose of unrelated
business tax was to place exempt organization commercial activities on same tax basis as taxable
organizations); 96 Cong. Rec. 769, 770 (1950) (President Truman's message to Congress regard-
ing Revenue Act of 1950 stressed need to improve equity in tax system by closing certain loopholes).
93. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (availability for use allocations place exempt
organizations at competitive disadvantage).
94. See Rensselaer, 79 T.C. at 971-72 (with fieldhouse equally available for exempt or non-
exempt purpose during idle time, actual-use allocation distributes expenses in proportion to use).
95. See DAVIDSON, HANDBOOK OF MODERN ACCOUNTING 18-10, 18-11 (1970) (straight-line
depreciation is function of time allocating cost regardless of asset usage); I.R.C. § 167(b)(1) (West
1984) (straight-line depreciation explicitly approved).
96. Rensselaer, 732 F.2d at 1062.
97. Id. Unlike any taxable business using a depreciation method based on time, an exempt
organization allocating the fixed expenses of its dual-use facility on the basis of availability for
use could not distribute any fixed expenses to the facility's idle time. Id.
98. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (actual-use allocations satisfy requisite
direct connection to unrelated activity as mandated by statute); supra notes 85-87 and accompa-
nying text (with fieldhouse equally available for either exempt or nonexempt functions, actual-
use allocations reasonable).
99. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (actual-use allocation is reasonable
accounting method which taxpayer has discretion to choose).
100. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (actual-use allocations allow exempt
organization to match taxable entities in allocating position of costs to idle time of assets, thus
fulfilling legislative intent to eliminate unfair competition and Code inequities).
101. See supra note 25 (importance of potential precedential value reflected in filing of
numerous amicus curiae briefs).
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and charitable organizations encounter in raising the necessary funds to main-
tain their level of service, such organizations will welcome the opportunity
to save some of their limited resources by reducing their unrelated business
income tax liability.
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